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Interview With
DAVID S. BRANDWEIN

22 July 1986

I met Dave Brandwein in his office on the 15th floor of the Systems Planning Corporation at about 1030. He told me that he worked for Space Technologies Laboratories under Albert D. "Bud" Wheelon before coming to the Agency in early 1964 to be deputy director of FMSAC under Carl Duckett. While at STL, Brandwein worked on Project [] which was jointly funded by ATIC and CIA. During that period he did some original analysis concerning the SS-8 missile. Also at STL at this time was [] who Brandwein described as a top-notch missile telemetry expert whose SS-9 analysis served as the basis for most Agency estimates. Prior to working at STL, Brandwein was involved in testing space propulsion systems and rocket engines.

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Brandwein said his impressions of Duckett were that he combined management technique with diplomacy and managed to get a lot out of his employees in the early years, but later forgot that he was head of a team and lost touch with his employees. Brandwein said he went along with Duckett on many of his briefing excursions to hold the show-and-tell cards. He gave Duckett high marks as a briefer who expanded the Agency's influence on Capitol Hill and in the White House. He remarked on Duckett's phenomenal memory. According to Brandwein, Duckett had good rapport with Henry Kissinger and tutored him in the fine points of telemetry as an analytical tool. Comparing Duckett with Wheelon, Brandwein said Wheelon would go out of his way to impress upon everyone how superior he was to them. He said Wheelon had reworked the equations for predicting ballistic missile flight and published them in about 1957-58. Wheelon was very intelligent but difficult to work for.

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When Duckett was a member of the Verification Panel Working Group, he had Brandwein named chairman of the subcommittee on ballistic missiles whose job was to hypothesize kinds of verification issues. During this period the main analytical inputs on the Soviet missile threat were: Brandwein, Evan Hineman, and [] on offensive missiles, and Sayre Stevens on the ABM area. Concerning the dispute over NIE 11.8.68, Brandwein said CIA just could not withstand Kissinger's horsepower, and cited the analysis word done by [] on the SS-9 missile accuracy argument. Even though the Agency's analysis was ultimately proven correct, at the time there was uncertainty. He pointed out that the analysts in DDI were using the FMSAC end products to produce their reports and sometimes had greater confidence in the data than did the FMSAC analysts.

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Brandwein said he got on very well with Schlesinger and liked him as DCI. He felt that Schlesinger was well prepared for the job long before he came to the Agency. He remembers going to the White House situation room with Schlesinger and Duckett to brief Kissinger and Admiral Moorer.

Comparing Dirks to Duckett, Brandwein said Dirks was totally uninterested in analysis and concerned himself entirely with systems. At the time, Brandwein was Director of Technical Services and said he was convinced that Dirks thought of OTS as a "back-alley garage" that produced 5-and-10-cent collection systems. Brandwein said Dirks, after becoming DDS&T, continued to manage OD&E and henpecked Don Haas, second guessing him at every turn. Brandwein did not like working for Dirks and left to become NIO-SP in 1978.

According to Brandwein, he thinks Duckett's story of what Kissinger told Helms concerning Bruce Clarke is overdrawn, because he never had any problem with Clarke in that regard. He stressed, however, that Kissinger's main source of intelligence on the Soviet threat was from the DS&T via Duckett

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and not from the DI or OSR. Any discussion of the NIE 11.8.68 debate that ignores the DS&T input, according to Brandwein, is incomplete.

Brandwein said Duckett had some problems with NSA over its attempt to corner the telemetry market. He said as long ago as 1960, when Brandwein was at STL, NSA was misreading telemetry. The people doing the best telemetry analysis were at STL working for Project [] at ATIC/FTD, and at Redstone Arsenal. Later, after the establishment of FMSAC, the Agency developed a considerable telemetry capability in its Signal Analysis Division under [] Duckett's problems were with a woman at NSA who worked under Lou Tordella. She wanted to shut off CIA's access to telemetry and Duckett believed this was wrong since the best telemetry was being collected by the Agency's [] sites and the nation's best analysts were working for the Agency by the late 1960s.

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NSSM #28 of 14 Mar 69 asked for SALT Study COLD DAWN p. 159
 Verification Panel formally established 21 July 69;
 created Working Group! COLD DAWN, p. 162


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"Verification implicitly links and dominates the other issues and provides a context for the talks. Verification relies on so-called national means." ... The Americans neither propose nor accept anything that cannot be verified w/ reasonably high confidence."

John Newhouse COLD DAWN - The Story of SALT
 Holt, Rinehart and Winston, NY. 1973 p. 14.


"~~Tallinn~~ Another splendid example of the ambiguity is the issue of "Tallinn upgrade," a hardly perennial of the internal debate. Indeed, even after seven years of sometime stormy controversy, Tallinn was, in the words of one senior White House bureaucrat, "the major unresolved issue inside our system." COLD DAWN, p. 11

Dean Rusk observes that the "political aspect of verification is at least as important as the technical. If the public and the Congress can be assured of a reasonable degree of verification they'll feel reasonably secure about the agreement." COLD DAWN, p. 17

 from the SALT Working Group in the Nixon White House

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in 1968
 The CIA, as a practical matter, functioned as a technical wing of ISA on SALT. [INTL SECURITY AFFAIRS]
 So did Systems Analysis." COLD DAWN, p. 118

SALT, in 1968, was controlled by  ISA unit in the Pentagon.

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Tallinn was the intractable issue - the only issue requiring high-level intervention

The CIA was asked to assess the verifiability of each weapon limitation proposed — how we could check up on compliance, how much cheating could take place before discovery, and the strategic consequences of the possible violations. — Henry Kissinger, ~~THE~~ WHITE HOUSE YEARS, (Boston, Little, Brown & Co.) 1977. p. 148

14 Mar 69, Nixon decides to continue "Sentinel" ABM prog., now renamed "Safeguard"

Dei Helms "stood his ground where lesser men might have resorted to ambiguity. Early in the Administration a school of thought developed that the triple warhead on the Soviet SS-9 intercontinental missile was a multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV) aimed at our Minuteman missile silos. The CIA maintained that the warheads could not be targeted independently. I leaned toward the more onerous interpretation."

— WHITE HOUSE YEARS, p. 37

DINO BRUGIONI ON DUCKETT ERA

Helms gave Duckett free rein in the strategic missiles arena, as a result, Duckett got into the estimating business which trod on the toes of the DDI's Office of Strategic Research. Helms speechwriter, [REDACTED], dealt only with general topics; matters technical were left completely to Duckett. As a result, Duckett spent a great deal of time on Capitol Hill briefing congressmen. In this regard, Duckett was as good as or better than Art Lundahl. He was so insistent on having proper briefing materials that he set up his own Graphics Shop headed by [REDACTED]. DDI Ed Proctor and his assistant [REDACTED] were terrible briefers, and OSR's Bruce Clarke was not much better. Duckett could handle all the estimating data, link it to missile technology and verification capability, and make sense of it. During the late 1960s, Duckett was very close to Senators Jackson and Tower and also to Henry Kissinger.

ADD&T Don Steininger never seemed to fit with Duckett. Although Steininger had great ideas for using computers, he never seemed to have the gift for making orderly presentations. Duckett's admin chief was [REDACTED] who kept the Directorate on an even keel. Duckett let [REDACTED] do everything except present promotions. After Duckett's heart attack circa 1974, the other Deputy Directors began ganging up on Duckett to try to get back some of the power that he had garnered. About this time [REDACTED]

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[] ON DUCKETT ERA

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After DCI Colby's resignation, DD&E was micromanaged by Congress, particularly Snodgrass. Although Schlesinger resigned as Secretary of Defense, it was widely believed in the Agency that President Ford fired him for attempting to make CIA a part of the Defense Department. [Not true, President Ford just cleaned house and got rid of Colby, Schlesinger, and Graham --

[] It was during this period that DIA caused so much difficulty with the Agency's ELINT collection effort. [] feels General Daniel Graham was responsible for the cancellation of []

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After DCI Helms' departure and Schlesinger's arrival, Duckett continued to have a relatively free rein. Schlesinger was too busy thinning out the ranks of the DDD to bother much with DS&T. Under DCI Colby, Duckett's power increased. Colby spent much of his time on Capitol Hill defending the Agency. It was during this period that Duckett began amassing an extraordinary decision-making power. Because Colby was so busy giving testimony, many major decisions were left to the Deputy Directors, some of whom were loath to decide. Duckett was never one to let a job go undone, and began making decisions for other Directorates. Once he started down this path, he discovered that many more people in the Agency needed his advice and wanted him to make their decisions also. Duckett became so engrossed in the day-to-day operational affairs of the Agency that he let slip his normal routine for overseeing the DS&T.

Duckett was more interested in getting a job done than in waiting for the responsible party to do it. In this manner he trod on a lot of toes. His answers were always straightforward, bold, and simply expressed. This was why Kissinger appreciated his advice.

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Although the [] concept was not Duckett's, it had his backing from the very beginning in late 1963 and early 1964. He saw it as the only answer to finding out what progress the Soviets were making in the missile arena. From his position as director of FMSAC, Duckett continued to support the project and was probably the one man in the entire government who fully understood its true value.

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[] is convinced that NRO Controller [] funded the [] satellite project in the same manner as he funded the film-return satellites: he believed they would run out of film or picture-taking ability within a year, thus more would be needed. This proved not to be the case, but the generous funding made it possible to bring the program in on time and almost within budget.

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 ON DUCKETT

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During 1972, Duckett, Kissinger, and Schlesinger, who was then AEC Chairman, had very secret consultations on nuclear matters. During this period, Duckett and Schlesinger got to know one another personally. Prior to this, in 1971, Schlesinger, when he was at the Bureau of the Budget, headed a panel that studied the Intelligence Community. In its report, that panel cited the DS&T as a well-run operation that was vital to the nation. As a result of these separate events, Duckett and Schlesinger were on the best of terms when Schlesinger arrived at the Agency as DCI in February 1973.

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During his five months at the helm, Schlesinger practically dismantled the DDP and replaced most the deputy directors, with the exception of Carl Duckett. Schlesinger also established a Management Committee to deal with major Agency decisions. The Committee comprised all the deputy directors, was chaired by DDCI Vernon A. Walters. The Committee did not become fully operational until after Colby became DCI, by which time Duckett was made the executive secretary who signed all the proceedings.

By this time, Duckett was the deputy director with the longest service, having been in place since late 1966. He was also the only one who was a regular attendee at National Security Council meetings. In fact, sometime in late 1973, President Nixon expressly asked Duckett to stay for the full NSC meetings -- his normal routine was to make his report and leave. says that in 1974, after Duckett's heart attack, Nixon told Colby he wanted Duckett to have all the perks of a DDCI, with his own special chauffeur.

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[redacted] points out that Duckett was not a member of the "club" of Eastern Establishment Yale and Harvard types and his rise to the pinnacle of the Agency was resented. On a number of occasions during 1974 Duckett was acting DCI. He was the logical person to occupy this position because, as executive secretary of the Management Committee he was the ranking deputy director whenever Colby was on the Hill and Walters was traveling abroad.

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LES DIRKS ON DUCKETT

Les Dirks said Duckett was openly anti-NSA and always made a point of showing how bad a job it was doing. By the time Dirks took over from Duckett, the two agencies were not talking. Dirks immediately began making monthly visits to NSA. Shortly thereafter the debate over CIA's unilateral SIGINT activities began; NSA said none of its requirements were being met.

[REDACTED]

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Dirks described DCI Bush as pleasant, but passive. Turner, on the other hand, thought the DDO was crazy and dangerous. However, as DCI, Turner was not frightened by the large sums of money required for the space projects. Dirks characterized Admiral Inman as feisty and contentious. Dirks thought the IC Staff was "feckless."

As for Casey, whose memories went back to the OSS, he bridled at the large dollars being asked for OD&E, the big bucks bothered him.

According to Dirks, Barry Kelly handled the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Dirks also said that it was John Crowley's idea to rename ODP as OD&E. Dirks concluded by saying that his tenure had no high points, that his tour was marked by continuing competition with Program A. He said six years was all he could take in this position.

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